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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Bruce Watson ("Watson") appeals his judgment of 
conviction and sentence for distribution and possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine base (also known as crack 
cocaine or crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). He 
was convicted and sentenced to 210 months imprisonment, 
three years of supervised release, and a $100 special 
assessment. Watson argues that the District Court should 
not have permitted narcotics agents to testify about general 
drug culture practices on substantive and foundational 
grounds in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 702, and that the 
District Court erred in allowing expert testimony concerning 
his mental state under Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). We reject 
Watson's first argument. However, we reverse the judgment 
of conviction and remand the case to the District Court 
because the Government's experts improperly testified that 
Watson's mental state was to distribute the cocaine base 
rather than to use the narcotics personally. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In 1998, Pennsylvania law enforcement officers received 
information that Watson was traveling on a Susquehanna 
Trailways bus to Williamsport, Pennsylvania to purchase 
drugs. Law enforcement officers Ronald Paret and Kirk F. 
Schwartz met the bus in Lehighton, boarded the bus, 
publicly announced that they were law enforcement officers 
conducting a drug investigation, and that passenger 
cooperation would be appreciated but was not required. 
 
Watson was sitting by himself. The officers asked him 
some routine questions, Watson denied having a ticket, and 
he denied having identification. Watson picked up a bag 
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lying on the seat next to him, began removing items from 
the bag, and a marijuana cigarette fell out. Watson 
admitted possession, a brief scuffle ensued, and Watson 
resisted arrest. After the officers restrained Watson they 
noticed a crumpled piece of paper on the floor next to him. 
The crumpled paper, which was from the Lycoming County 
Public Assistance Office in Williamsport, had Watson's 
name on it, and it contained crack. 
 
The officers transported Watson to the Pennsylvania 
State Police barracks in Lehighton. During processing 
investigators recovered four packages of marijuana and 
approximately 100 small plastic bags. Watson explained 
that he took his bus trip to attend a funeral and that the 
plastic bags were for a friend. Laboratory tests revealed a 
total of 2.4 grams of crack cocaine and 7.42 grams of 
marijuana. 
 
During the trial, Officer Schwartz provided testimony 
concerning the 100 plastic bags found on Watson: 
 
        [MR. ROCKTASHEL:] Now, based on your experience 
       and training of purchasing drugs and working as a 
       Narcotics Investigator, have you formed an opinion, as 
       to whether or not the substance contained in 
       Government Exhibit 1 was possess [sic] with the intent 
       to distribute, transfer or deliver or the intent to 
       personally use that drug? 
 
         MR. CASEY: Objection. This witness is not 
       competent to testify as to the mental state of the 
       Defendant. That's the jury's prerogative, and Federal 
       Rule [of Evidence] 704(b) specifically precludes it. 
 
         THE COURT: Overruled. 
 
         MR. ROCKTASHEL: You may answer the question, 
       sir. 
 
         [MR. SCHWARTZ]: I believe it was possess [sic] 
       with the intent to distribute to somebody else. 
 
(App. at 58.) 
 
Later, Officer Gordon Mincer testified that the crack 
found on Watson was consistent with someone selling 
cocaine rather than using it for personal consumption. 
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Mincer also testified about the 100 plastic bags found on 
Watson. Before Mincer provided his testimony, the District 
Court overruled Watson's objection under Fed. R. Evid. 
704(b). Mincer provided the following testimony: 
 
        [MR. ROCKTASHEL:] Now, you've had a chance to 
       look at Government Exhibit 1 and Government Exhibit 
       7. And I'd ask, having reviewed those, have you formed 
       an opinion, as to whether or not the substance 
       contained in Government Exhibit 1 was possessed with 
       the intent to distribute, transfer or deliver versus the 
       intent to personally consume that substance? 
 
        . . . . 
 
        [MR. MINCER:] Yes, sir. Based on my experience, 
       through my undercover investigations, I've seen, on 
       numerous occasions, subjects that have amounts of 
       crack cocaine like this, as well as these packaging 
       bags, which they were cutting off and packaging in 
       these bags for resale, which I've also purchased. 
 
        And that would be consistent with someone who is 
       selling cocaine versus someone who would be using it 
       for their personal use. 
 
(App. at 89-90.) 
 
The Government also called Agent Paret as a rebuttal 
witness to testify concerning the nature of Watson's bus 
travel itinerary. Agent Paret provided the following 
testimony: 
 
        [MR. ROCKTASHEL:] With respect to the particular 
       trip taken here, by Bruce Watson, have you formed an 
       opinion as to whether or not that particular trip was 
       taken for the purpose of distribution, transfer and 
       delivery of drugs, as opposed to procurement of drugs 
       for personal use? 
 
         MR. CASEY: Objection. Again, that calls for a 
       reading of the mind of the Defendant, as to the 
       purpose of the trip. Again, the Court has instructed 
       that could be consistent with experiences in the past, 
       but the question, as posed, it goes beyond the 
       competence of the witness. 
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         MR. ROCKTASHEL: Your Honor, we're not 
       proposing that he render an opinion, as to the 
       Defendant's intent, but we're asking him to testify, with 
       regard to particular circumstances and facts of the 
       trip, the destination point, etc. 
 
         THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. The 
       testimony will be allowed for that limited purpose. 
 
         [MR. PARET:] Generally, a trip of a short nature 
       like that, a 10-plus hour trip to Philadelphia, spending 
       four hours there, on my experience, has been that 
       they've gone into the city to purchase drugs to, 
       ultimately, take back and resell at their starting point. 
 
(App. at 160-61.) 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
Watson's notice of appeal was timely filed. 
 
We review the District Court's ruling on the admissibility 
of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. 
Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 819 (1999). 
 
A. 
 
Watson argues that the Government's experts' testimony 
was inadmissible because knowledge of the operations of 
narcotics dealers is not a proper field of expertise. Because 
Watson did not raise a contemporaneous Rule 702 
objection to the expert testimony we review the admission 
of expert testimony for plain error, looking for errors that 
are "obvious, or . . . otherwise seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Parrilla, 7 F.3d 1097, 
1100 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). 
 
Under Rule 702, a witness may offer an expert opinion if 
he or she is "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education." Fed. R. Evid. 702; see 
also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-46 
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(3d Cir. 1994). We have interpreted Rule 702's 
qualifications requirement liberally. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741. 
"[W]here such testimony's factual basis, data, principles, 
methods, or their application are called sufficiently into 
question . . . the trial judge must determine whether the 
testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and 
experience of [the relevant] discipline." Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
Although Rule 702 does not mention any qualifying 
specific fields of expertise, the advisory committee notes 
indicate that a wide variety of expert testimony is 
contemplated by the Rule: 
 
        The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge 
       which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the 
       "scientific" and "technical" but extend to all 
       "specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, 
       not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by 
       "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education." 
       Thus within the scope of the rule are not only experts 
       in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians, 
       physicists, and architects, but also the large group 
       sometimes called "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers 
       or landowners testifying to land values. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee's Notes to 1972 
Proposed Rule 702. 
 
The courts that have considered this issue have 
recognized the operations of narcotics dealers as a proper 
field of expertise. It is well-established that government 
agents may testify to the meaning of coded drug language 
under Fed. R. Evid. 702. United States v. Gibbs , 190 F.3d 
188 (3d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. 
Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1989), 
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 
526 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 
1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the jargon of the narcotics 
trade and drug dealers' code language are proper subjects 
of expert opinion), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999); 
United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(same); United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 232 
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(2d Cir. 1991) (same). In addition, "experienced narcotics 
agent[s] may testify about the significance of certain 
conduct or methods of operation to the drug distribution 
business, as such testimony is often helpful in assisting the 
trier of fact understand the evidence." United States v. 
Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United 
States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1283 (5th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1132 (1995)). Thus, the operations of 
narcotics dealers have repeatedly been found to be a 
suitable topic for expert testimony because they are not 
within the common knowledge of the average juror. 
Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 590-92. Therefore, we reject 
Watson's argument; knowledge of the operations of 
narcotics dealers is a proper field of expertise. 
 
Moreover, the District Court did not err in allowing expert 
testimony from Schwartz, Mincer, and Paret. Agents 
Schwartz, Mincer, and Paret were well-qualified to testify 
concerning drug activity and the Government presented 
sufficient evidence to establish the reliability of their 
purported fields of expertise. Agent Schwartz testified that 
he made several hundred arrests for controlled substances 
offenses, he was familiar with drug packaging and 
distribution, he inspected drugs, drug paraphernalia, and 
he had participated in approximately 200 bus interdictions. 
Agent Mincer testified to his experience in executing search 
warrants for drugs, his undercover drug purchases, and his 
making more than 200 arrests for crack. Agent Paret 
testified about his experience as a United States Customs 
Inspector and as a drug investigator working for eight years 
on drug interdiction involving public transportation. The 
Government's experts each possessed specialized knowledge 
concerning drugs and drug interdiction and their testimony 
was helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence. 
Therefore, the District Court did not commit plain error 
when it admitted Agents Schwartz's, Mincer's, and Paret's 
testimony relating to the general operations of narcotics 
dealers. 
 
B. 
 
Next, Watson argues that the District Court erred in 
allowing expert testimony concerning Watson's mental 
state, i.e., that Watson intended to distribute the narcotics. 
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Under Fed. R. Evid. 704(b), no expert witness "testifying 
with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant 
in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state 
or condition constituting an element of the crime charged 
or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters 
for the trier of fact alone." Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Rule 704(b) 
applies to all instances in which expert testimony is offered 
as to mental state or a condition constituting an element of 
the crime charged or defense thereto. Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 
211 (applying Rule 704(b) to expert testimony by 
undercover narcotics officer in drug conspiracy prosecution).1 
 
Expert testimony concerning the modus operandi  of 
individuals involved in drug trafficking does not violate Rule 
704(b). For example, a Government expert may testify 
about the meaning of narcotics code words. 
Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 590-92; see also Boissoneault, 
926 F.2d at 232-33 (same); United States v. Boyd , 55 F.3d 
667, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that expert testimony 
concerning the modus operandi of individuals involved in 
drug trafficking does not violate Rule 704(b)). A Government 
expert may also testify about the quantity, purity, usual 
dosage units, and street value of narcotics. United States v. 
Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 895 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1983), reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-3413 ("[T]he rationale for precluding 
ultimate opinion psychiatric testimony extends beyond the insanity 
defense to any ultimate mental state of the defendant that is relevant to 
the legal conclusion sought to be proven. The Committee has fashioned 
its Rule 704 provision to reach all such `ultimate' issues, e.g., 
premeditation in a homicide case, or lack of predisposition in 
entrapment."); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(holding Rule 704(b) applies to all instances in which expert testimony is 
offered as to mental state or condition constituting an element of the 
crime charged or defense thereto); United States. v. Orr, 68 F.3d 1247, 
1252 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1064 (1996) (determining 
that "the rule prohibits an expert witness from testifying that a 
defendant did or did not possess the requisite mental intent at the time 
of the crime"); United States v. DiDomenico , 985 F.2d 1159, 1165 (2d Cir. 
1993) (determining that in prosecution for interstate transportation of 
stolen goods, the trial court did not err in excluding under Rule 704(b) 
expert testimony as to whether defendant knew goods were stolen). 
 
                                8 
  
945 (1988). And, an expert may testify about the various 
counter-surveillance techniques used by drug dealers to 
avoid detection by the police. United States v. de Soto, 885 
F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 
There is, however, "a [fine] line that expert witnesses may 
not cross." United States v. Mitchell, 996 F.2d 419, 422 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). It is well established that experts may 
describe, in general and factual terms, the common 
practices of drug dealers. See Boyd, 55 F.3d at 671 (citing 
cases). Expert testimony is admissible if it merely 
"support[s] an inference or conclusion that the defendant 
did or did not have the requisite mens rea, so long as the 
expert does not draw the ultimate inference or conclusion 
for the jury and the ultimate inference or conclusion does 
not necessarily follow from the testimony." United States v. 
Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting United 
States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 1997)). "It 
is only as to the last step in the inferential process--a 
conclusion as to the defendant's mental state--that Rule 
704(b) commands the expert to be silent." United States v. 
Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 
Rule 704(b) may be violated when the prosecutor's 
question is plainly designed to elicit the expert's testimony 
about the mental state of the defendant, Boyd , 55 F.3d at 
672, or when the expert triggers the application of Rule 
704(b) by directly referring to the defendant's intent, mental 
state, or mens rea, United States v. Lipscomb , 14 F.3d 
1236, 1240 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 704 prohibits "testimony 
from which it necessarily follows, if the testimony is 
credited, that the defendant did or did not possess the 
requisite mens rea." Bennett, 161 F.3d at 182 (quoting 
Morales, 108 F.3d at 1037). 
 
Watson argues that the Government violated Rule 704(b) 
because its three witnesses testified as to Watson's mental 
state. First, Watson argues that Officer Schwartz's 
testimony concerning the purpose for the 100 plastic bags 
found on his person violated Rule 704(b). We agree. The 
prosecutor, Mr. Rocktashel, pushed his questions too far 
and he repeatedly elicited expert testimony in violation of 
Rule 704(b). Mr. Rocktashel's question to Officer Schwartz 
was plainly designed to elicit the expert's testimony about 
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Watson's intent. Mr. Rocktashel's repeated references to 
Watson's intent elicited the offending response from Officer 
Schwartz when he testified that, in his opinion, Watson 
"possess[ed] with the intent to distribute to someone else." 
 
Second, Watson argues that the colloquy between Mr. 
Rocktashel and Officer Mincer elicited testimony that 
violated Rule 704(b). Prosecutors may not circumvent Rule 
704(b) by repeatedly referring to a defendant's intent in a 
question to an expert. Mr. Rocktashel's repeated invocation 
of the word "intent," framed Mincer's "Yes sir," response in 
such a way that the necessary inference to be drawn from 
Mincer's response was that Watson possessed crack with 
the intent to distribute it. Therefore, Mincer's"Yes sir" 
response violated Rule 704(b). 
 
Third, Watson argues that Agent Paret's rebuttal 
testimony concerning the nature of Watson's bus travel 
itinerary violated Rule 704(b). The prosecutor may not elicit 
expert testimony on the ultimate issue of fact; that is for 
the jury alone to decide. Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). In this case, 
Mr. Rocktashel's question to Paret, like his questions to 
Schwartz and Mincer, was designed to elicit testimony 
about Watson's intent. Rocktashel asked whether Watson's 
particular "trip . . . [was] for the purpose of distribution, 
transfer and delivery of drugs, as opposed to procurement 
of drugs for personal use?" Although Agent Paret did not 
specifically refer to Watson in his response, and used the 
collective "they" when indicating "they'd gone into the city 
to purchase drugs to, ultimately, take back and resell at 
their starting point," Paret's opinion necessarily implies that 
the purpose of Walker's short bus trip was to distribute 
drugs rather than to obtain drugs for personal use. The 
unmistakable import of Agent Paret's opinion was that 
Watson intended to buy drugs to distribute them. Not only 
did Paret's opinion violate Rule 704(b), but it clearly went 
beyond Paret's competence, as counsel noted in his 
objection. In addition, by letting this testimony stand as 
expert opinion, the District Court allowed Walker's 
credibility to be destroyed, because he testified that he was 
in Philadelphia to attend a funeral. 
 
In sum, the Government violated Rule 704(b) by 
repeatedly eliciting from its experts testimony as to 
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Watson's mental state and the purpose of his actions. The 
defendant's intent is an ultimate issue of fact that the jury 
alone must decide. Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). In addition, even if 
we assume, for the sake of argument, that the 
Government's experts were qualified to speak about 
Watson's mental condition at the time of the offense, Rule 
704(b) prohibits any expert from testifying about the 
defendant's actual mental state. Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). E.g., 
United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(allowing the introduction of expert testimony on 
defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense but 
limiting expert testimony to factual description of the 
defendant's mental capacity), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 
(1988). Of course, narcotics experts may testify about drug 
dealing, but they are in no way qualified to testify about a 
defendant's mental condition. Therefore, the District Court 
erred when it admitted the Government's expert testimony 
concerning Watson's mental state. That evidence went to 
the heart of the Government's case and plainly prejudiced 
defendant. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will REVERSE the 
Judgment and Commitment Order and REMAND the case 
to the District Court for further proceedings. 
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